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Abstract
We investigate public infrastructure investment that reduces production costs in
oligopoly markets. The government decides on its public investment based on cost/benet
analysis that estimates the benet as a reduction in production costs. In the short run,
equilibrium investment falls short of the social optimum level (i.e. underinvestment)
because it neglects the welfare gain of the subsequent production expansion. In the
long run, equilibrium investment may exceed the social optimum level (i.e. overinvest-
ment), depending on the demand and cost functions. This simple cost/benet measure
is thus conservative in the short run, but may not be from the long-run viewpoint.
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1 Introduction
We investigate public infrastructure investment that reduces production costs in oligopoly
markets. We propose a simple cost/benet analysis that estimates the benet as a reduction
in production costs and investigate the welfare consequence of this rule. We nd that in
the short run, equilibrium investment falls short of the social optimum level (i.e. under-
investment) because it neglects the welfare gain of the subsequent production expansion.
In the long run, however, equilibrium investment may exceed the social optimum level (i.e.
overinvestment), depending on the demand and cost functions. These results suggest that
this simple cost/benet measure is thus conservative in the short run, but may not be from
the long-run viewpoint.
Developing countries still require a huge amount of public investment. Institutions such
as the Asian and African Development Banks as well as the newly established Asian Infras-
tructure Investment Bank have been created to meet demand for such investment.
Even in developed countries, public infrastructure investment is still high. For example,
the US, British, Japanese, and Korean governments spent between 2% and 5% of GDP on
public investment in 2011.1 While much public investment aims to improve the welfare of
inhabitants and consumers, some such investments like the constructions of industrial parks,
roads, ports, and network facilities as well as public R&D investment at least partially aim
to support businesses by directly reducing production costs. In this study, we focus on this
latter type of cost-reducing public investment.
The reduction in production costs increases rms' prots by the same amount if the
price remains unchanged. If the price falls according to the reduction in production costs,
it increases the consumer surplus, too. In both cases, the reduction in production costs
1See http://www5.cao.go.jp/j-j/wp/wp-je13/h05 hz030303.html.
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directly increases total social surplus by the same amount. We refer to these benets as
`technological benets' or `cost-saving benets'. Technological benets are calculated once
the government knows the eect of the public investments in production costs and can be
easily introduced into their cost/benet analysis.2
However, cost-reducing public investment may generate additional eects, especially in
imperfectly competitive markets, because the expansion of production caused by public
investment may reduce the deadweight loss due to the underprovision of goods. These
additional benets can be summarized as the welfare gain of the public investment minus
technological benets. Generally, the estimation of such additional benets is far more
dicult than that of cost-saving benets because it requires the government to obtain a lot
of additional information.3 For example, the government must obtain accurate information
on the demand curve and/or price-cost margin to estimate the magnitude of this eect.
However, the reliable estimation of the demand function and/or price-cost margin requires
rich datasets, while it is also dicult to estimate market conditions in not near-future
markets.4
Because of the diculties of evaluating these additional benets, their estimation is likely
to become arbitrary and overly optimistic owing to cognitive limitations and bureaucratic
incentives.5 Moreover, in much public infrastructure investment, the cost of overinvestment
2See Diewert (1986) for more discussion on the cost-saving benets. In most developed countries,
cost/benet analysis is required before executing public investment and thus the guidelines for cost/benet
analysis are well developed.
3Although how to measure the cost-saving eect is intensively discussed in the literature, Boardman et
al. (2010) pointed out that that the measurement of additional eects is dicult under oligopoly. Indeed,
these authors provided no way in which to evaluate them under oligopoly.
4If the social discount rate is high, the conditions for far-future markets may not matter. However, in
many developed countries, the social discount rate is low. For example, the guideline rates in Germany,
the United Kingdom, and Japan are 3%, 3.5%, and 4%, respectively. In addition, the social discount rate
should equal the yield on long gilts, and even these rates may be too high given the recent low interest rates
in these countries.
5This `optimistic bias' is noted in many government guidelines (e.g. https://www.treasury.qld.
gov.au/publications-resources/project-assessment-framework/paf-cost-benet-analysis.pdf (the guideline
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exceeds that of underinvestment because investments are sunk costs and the government
cannot sell excessive facilities. Therefore, conservative estimation is more suitable for public
investment.
To convey the policy implication in the clearest manner, we consider the situation in
which the government adopts a conservative attitude to its cost/benet analysis. Boardman
et al. (2010) suggested that the worst-case scenario should be adopted in sensitivity analy-
sis.6 In this context, the worst-case scenario might be to assume that the additional benets
are zero.7 We thus suppose that the government only considers technological benets and
chooses its investment level to maximize the cost-saving benets minus the investment cost.
We compare this equilibrium investment level with the socially optimal one that reects
all the welfare eects of the public investment.8 We then discuss whether this cost/benet
analysis in fact yields conservative public investment.
Because the government neglects the additional eects of public investment, we naturally
expect that the equilibrium level falls short of the social optimum, and thus, the above rule
is conservative. We show that this is indeed true in the short run (when the number of rms
is given exogenously). However, it is not always true in the long run (when the number of
rms are determined as a free entry condition).9
In the long run, the equilibrium investment is socially optimal when demand is linear
of Queensland, Australia)). See also Boardman et al. (2010).
6Considering the worst-case scenario is actually required by a number of government guidelines. See,
for example, http://www.mlit.go.jp/tec/hyouka/public/090601/shishin/shishin090601.pdf (Japanese na-
tional guideline), https://www.treasury.qld.gov.au/publications-resources/project-assessment-framework/
paf-cost-benet-analysis.pdf (the guideline of Queensland, Australia), and the references therein.
7If negative additional eects such as environmental damage are apparent, neglecting them does not imply
conservative investment and such negative externality eects should be incorporated into the cost/benet
analysis. In this study, we do not consider such technological externalities.
8We ignore all interventions in the product market; thus, we consider the second-best investment level
to be the social optimum one.
9In many contexts, a free entry market often results in contrasting implications. See Cato and Matsumura
(2013), Etro (2004, 2007), Ino and Matsumura (2012), Lahiri and Ono (1995, 2007), and Matsumura and
Kanda (2005).
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and the eect of the cost reduction is proportional to the output level (we call this the
double linear case). By contrast, in the double concave case (i.e. when demand is concave,
the cost-saving eect is concave with respect to output and at least one of the two is strictly
concave), the equilibrium investment level exceeds the social optimum. Cost-reducing public
investment thus increases the number of entering rms, resulting in additional distortion.
This distortion eect is so signicant that investments become excessive when demand and
the cost-saving eect are concave. That is, public investment may increase the deadweight
loss in the long run. However, in the double convex case (i.e. demand is convex, the cost-
saving eect is convex with respect to output, and at least one of these two is strictly convex),
the equilibrium investment level falls short of the social optimum. In brief, the additional
benets of public investment can be both positive and negative in the long run, although
they are always positive in the short run. Thus, cost/benet analysis that ignores these
additional eects under imperfect competition does not always yield conservative public
investment.
Because the public infrastructure expiration date is usually long, the long-run evaluation
of public investment is relevant. Our result clearly points out that the long-run eciency
of public infrastructure investment should not be evaluated in the same way as short-run
eciency. In the short run, assuming no additional benets is a conservative approach
because it overlooks some of the positive eects. However, it may suer from excessive
investment in the long run. In other words, only considering the cost-saving benets may
not be conservative and may induce overinvestment in the long run. Our result suggests that
cost/benet analysis should distinguish between short-run and long-run evaluations, even
though this point has generally been ignored in existing research and government guidelines
on cost/benet analysis.10
10Some academic papers have considered rms' entry in the context of cost/benet analysis (e.g. Holtz-
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Our analysis is closely related to the excess entry theorem of Mankiw and Whinston
(1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987).11 In the long run, cost-reducing public investment
stimulates new entries, and thereby, harms welfare. We should note, however, that the
welfare gain of public investment can exceed the cost-saving benets (i.e. public investment
can be insucient) in spite of its entry-enhancing eect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of
production cost-reducing public investment. Section 3 analyzes the case with a xed number
of rms as a benchmark. Section 4 investigates the free entry model. Section 5 examines
the model of entry cost-reducing public investment. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
There are innitely many potential new entrants. Each potential new entrant has cost
function c(x; I) + F , where c(x; I) : R2+ 7! R+ is the production cost, x 2 R+ is the output
of the rm, I 2 R+ is the public investment, and F 2 R++ is the xed entry cost. The
public investment is assumed to reduce the marginal costs. We assume that c(x; I) is three
times dierentiable, cx  0; cxx  0; cxI < 0; cxII > 0 8x  0 (the subscript denotes
the derivative, for example, cx = @c=@x and cxx = @
2c=@x2). In addition, we assume that
cI(0; I) = 0 (i.e. if a rm does not produce, the public investment does not benet the
rm).
Let n ( 1) be the number of entering rms. We dene g(x; I) :=  cI(x; I) and
G(n; x; I) := ng(x; I), where G(n; x; I) is the direct marginal gain (cost-saving benet)
Eakin and Lovely, 1996; Rouwendal, 2012). However, their focus was not on the additional eect on the
deadweight loss under imperfect competition, as discussed throughout the present paper. Moreover, they
ignored the welfare loss due to public investment inducing more entries.
11See also Konishi et al. (1990) and Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura (1993). We discuss the relationship
of our result with another important work on excess entry presented by Lahiri and Ono (1988) in Section 4.
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of the public investment. We consider three cases, that is g(x; I) is strictly concave, con-
vex, or linear with respect to x. An example of the cost function of the linear case is
c(x) = C(x)  k(I)x, which is often used in the literature on cost-reducing investment.12
Let X be total output in the market. The (inverse) demand function is given by p(X) :
R+ 7! R+, where p(X) is twice dierentiable and p0(X) < 0 for all X as long as p > 0.
The game runs as follows. In the rst stage, the government chooses public investment
I. In the second stage, after observing I, potential new entrants choose whether they enter
the market. In the third stage, after observing the number of new entrants n, each new
entrant i (i = 1:::; n) independently chooses xi. We assume that demand is suciently large
and/or F is suciently small that n  1 holds in all relevant subgames.
3 Benchmark: Short-Run Analysis
In this section, we discuss a case with a xed number of rms n as a benchmark. There is
no entry stage (second stage) and the number of rms n ( 1) is given exogenously.
In the last stage, n-symmetric rms face Cournot competition. The rst-order condition
of rm i is
p+ p0xi   cx = 0: (1)
We assume that the strategies in the production stage are strategic substitutes (i.e. p0+p00x <
0) or cxx is suciently large.
13
We restrict our attention to the symmetric equilibrium in which all rms choose the
12The example of the non-linear (non-uniform) case is as follows. Suppose that small producers mainly
use coal plants and large producers require natural gas plants because environmental regulations are stricter
for heavier polluters. If public investment is made in ports mainly used for importing coal (natural gas),
g(x; I) is concave (convex) with respect to the output level.
13If the strategies are strategic complements (i.e. p0+ p00x > 0) and cxx is small, neither the second-order
condition nor the stability condition are satised.
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same output level. Let xS(n; I) and XS := nxS(n; I) denote the equilibrium output of each
rm and total output in this short-run game, respectively.
The government expects x correctly, estimates the marginal cost-saving benets of public
investment G(n; x; I), and maximizes the benets minus investment cost given x.14 Needless
to say, G(n; x; I) is not the exact marginal welfare gain of the public investment. For the
reasons discussed in the Introduction, we assume that the government regards the cost-
saving benets as the welfare gain. The rst-order condition of the government is
G(n; x; I) = 1:
Let IES be the equilibrium investment level in the short run.
Next, we discuss social welfare. Total social surplus is given by
W =
Z XS
0
p(q)dq   n(c(x; I) + F )  I: (2)
Consider the social optimum investment level given the Cournot competition in the last
stage (the second-best investment level). The rst-order condition is
dW
dI
= (p  cx)@X
S
@I
+G  1 = 0: (3)
From (1), p > cx (the price exceeds the marginal production cost under imperfect compe-
tition). Therefore, from (3), we nd that the marginal welfare gain of public investment
exceeds the marginal investment cost when I = IES if and only if @XS=@I > 0:
14If the government overestimates G, overinvestment may take place.
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From (1) and the equation XS = nxs, we obtain
dXS
dI
=
ncxI
(n+ 1)p0 + np00x  cxx : (4)
This is positive because cxI < 0, p
0 < 0, and p0 + p00x < 0 (strategic substitutes) or cxx is
suciently large.
The following proposition summarizes the above discussions.
Proposition 1 When n  1 is given exogenously, the public investment level falls short of
the ecient one if the government regards the cost-saving benets only.
As long as the public investment increases total output, G(n; x; I) underestimates the
marginal welfare gain. Therefore, the proposed measure is conservative for deciding the
level of public investment.
4 Long-Run Analysis: Free Entry Equilibrium
We now discuss the long-run eect of public investment. We solve the three-stage game
with an entry decision stage by backward induction.
In the third stage, rm i (i = 1; :::; n) in the market simultaneously chooses xi to
maximize its prot, given I. The rst-order condition is given by (1). We again assume the
symmetric equilibrium in this stage.
In the second stage, innitely many potential new entrants decide whether to enter the
market. The number of entrants n is given by the zero-prot condition:
px  c  F = 0: (5)
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Equations (1) and (5) determine n and x given I. We denote the number of entrants and
output of each rm by nL and xL, respectively. Let XL := nLxL.
We now present a supplemental result on the relationship between I and total output
XL.
Lemma 1 XL is strictly increasing in I (i.e. an increase in the public investment increases
total output).
Proof See Appendix.
In the rst stage, the government chooses I. The government expects n and x and
chooses I such that G(n; x; I) = 1 as in the short-run case. Let IEL be the equilibrium
investment level in the long run.
We now discuss the exact welfare gain of I. Consider the social optimum investment
level given the behavior of the second and third stages discussed above. The rst-order
condition is
dW
dI
= (p  cx)@x
L
@I
+ (pxL   c  F )@n
L
@I
+G  1
= (p  cx)@x
L
@I
+G  1 = 0; (6)
where we use (5).
We now present our main result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that n is endogenously determined by the zero-prot condition.
Suppose also that the government regards the benets of the public investment as the cost-
saving benets only.
(i) The equilibrium investment level exceeds (falls short of, is equal to) the ecient one if
per-rm output is decreasing in (increasing in, independent of) the public investment.
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(ii) The equilibrium investment is ecient for welfare in the double linear case (i.e. both
demand function p and cost-reducing gain function G are linear with respect to output).
(iii) The equilibrium investment is excessive if both p and G are concave and at least one of
them is strictly concave with respect to output.
(iv) The equilibrium investment is insucient if both p and G are convex and at least one
of them is strictly convex with respect to output.
Proof See Appendix.
From the short-run perspective, the supposed measure of the marginal gain in public
investment G(n; x; I) always yields insucient investments (Proposition 1). In this sense,
the proposed measure is conservative. However, in the long run, it can be exact (in the
double linear case) or overestimated (in the double concave case). In contrast to the short-
run case, an increase in the public investment induces additional entries in the long run.
Similar to the short-run case, an increase in the public investment increases total output
(Lemma 1) but owing to the rise in the number of entering rms, not the increase in per-
rm output. In the double concave case, an increase in the public investment reduces the
output of each entrant and decreases production eciency.15 For this reason, the cost-saving
benets of public investment G can be larger than the exact welfare gain.
To obtain the exact welfare gain of the public investment, the government must know the
precise demand and cost-reduction curves. However, it can judge whether only considering
the cost-saving benet is conservative if it knows whether these curves are concave or convex.
Hence, we should recognize that the additional eect of the public investment can be negative
15In the double concave case, an increase in the public investment increases total output and reduces the
output of each entrant. This nding implies that an increase in the public investment yields production
substitution from rms that entered the market before the increase in the public investment to the new
entrants who would not enter without it. Because the marginal cost of rms that have already entered
the market is smaller than the price, while the average cost of new entrants is equal to the price, the
above production substitution reduces production eciency and harms welfare. For a discussion on welfare-
reducing production substitution, see Lahiri and Ono (1988).
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in the long run.
5 Entry Cost-Reducing Public Investment
In the previous sections, we assumed that the public investment reduces production costs.
In this section, we briey discuss the case in which it reduces entry cost F . Constructing
industrial parks is an example of such public investment. Suppose that c is independent of
I. Let F (I) be the entry cost function. We assume that F 0 < 0 and F 00 > 0. We also assume
that F 00 is suciently large so that the relevant second-order conditions are satised. The
game is the same as that formulated in Section 2, except that F , not c, depends I.
Again, the total output of the rms is strictly increasing in I.
Lemma 2 XL is strictly increasing in I (i.e. an increase in the public investment increases
total output).
Proof See Appendix.
Let G(n; I) :=  nF 0 be the marginal cost-saving benets of public investment I. The
government expects n and chooses I such that G(n; I) = 1. Let IEL be the equilibrium
investment level.
We now discuss the exact welfare gain of I. Consider the social optimum investment level
given the behavior of the second and third stages discussed above. Again, the rst-order
condition is
dW
dI
= (p  cx)@x
L
@I
+ (pxL   c  F )@n
L
@I
+G  1
= (p  cx)@x
L
@I
+G  1 = 0; (7)
where we use (5).
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Proposition 3 Suppose that n is endogenously determined by the zero-prot condition.
Suppose also that the government regards the benet of the public investment as the cost-
saving eect only. If the public investment aects entry cost F rather than production cost
c, the equilibrium investment level exceeds (falls short of) the ecient one if the strategies
in the production stage are strategic substitutes (complements).
Proof See Appendix.
In contrast to Proposition 2, as long as the strategies in the nal stage are strategic
substitutes, the cost-saving benets of the public investment are always larger than the true
welfare gain, resulting in an overinvestment in social welfare. An increase in the public
investment stimulates new entries, whereas it does not stimulate the production of each
entering rm, as opposed to the production cost-reducing investment. Further, the public
investment accelerates the ineciency caused by excessive entries and reduces some of the
cost-saving benets.
In reality, the public investment may reduce both entry and production costs. In this
case, Proposition 2 (iii) is strengthened by introducing the entry cost-reducing eect be-
cause both eects have the same direction.16 In other words, if both the demand and the
marginal cost-saving gain functions are concave, the welfare gain of the cost-reducing public
investment falls short of the cost-saving gain.
By contrast, Proposition 2 (iv) and Proposition 3 have dierent directions as long as
the strategies are strategic substitutes. Therefore, even if both the demand and the direct
marginal gain functions are convex, the true welfare gain of the cost-reducing public invest-
ment may be smaller than the cost-saving gain when the public investment reduces F as
well as c.
16Note that if the demand function is concave, the strategies are always strategic substitutes.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we investigate public infrastructure investment that reduces the costs of rms.
First, we investigate production cost-reducing public investment. We demonstrate that the
welfare gain of cost-reducing public investment exceeds the cost-saving benets in the short
run. Thus, the investment level derived from cost/benet analysis that only considers the
cost-saving benets falls short of the social optimum one. In the long run, however, the
cost-saving benet is either larger or smaller than the true welfare gain. Therefore, the
equilibrium investment level can exceed or fall short of the optimal one in the long run. We
present a sucient condition for the equilibrium investment being optimal, insucient, and
excessive.
Next, we investigate entry cost-reducing public investment. We show that the welfare
gain of cost-reducing public investment falls short of the cost-saving benet regardless of the
demand condition as long as the strategies in the production stage are strategic substitutes.
In this study, we focus on the cost-reducing eect of public investment. We can show
that our analysis applies to situations in which they increase product value for consumers.
Public investment that reduces per-rm output, but not total output, exceeds the optimum
investment. However, our analysis may not apply to the case in which public investment
aims to reduce negative externalities such as carbon emissions. If serious negative external-
ities exist and appropriate environmental policies internalizing these externalities are not
adopted, per-rm output can be too large from the viewpoint of social welfare. Under
such a circumstance, public investment that restricts both the number of entering rms and
per-rm output may be desirable. Incorporating environmental problems into our analysis
remains for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We show that dXL=dI = nL(dxL=dI) + (dnL=dI)xL > 0. By dierentiating (1) and (5), we
obtain 0B@xLp0 + (xL)2p00 (nL + 1)p0 + nLxLp00   cxx
(xL)2p0 nLxLp0 + p  cx
1CA
0B@dnL
dxL
1CA =
0B@cxI
cI
1CA dI: (8)
Using (1), nLxLp0 + p  cx = (nL   1)xLp0. It follows that
det
0B@xLp0 + (xL)2p00 (nL + 1)p0 + nLxLp00   cxx
(xL)2p0 nLxLp0 + p  cx
1CA
=  (xL)2p0(2p0 + xLp00   c0xx) < 0 (9)
because the second-order condition of (1) ensures 2p0 + xLp00   cxx < 0.
By applying Cramer's rule to (8), we obtain
dxL
dI
=
p0xL(cI   xLcxI) + (xL)2cIp00
 (xL)2p0(p0 + xLp00 + p0   c0xx)
(10)
dnL
dI
=
(nL   1)xLp0cxI   (nL + 1)p0cI   nLxLp00cI + cxxcI
 (xL)2p0(p0 + xLp00 + p0   c0xx)
: (11)
By using (10) and (11), we obtain
dXL
dI
= nL
dxL
dI
+
dnL
dI
xL
=
 (xL)2p0cxI   cIp0xL + xLcxxcI
 (xL)2p0(2p0 + xLp00   c0xx)
: (12)
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The numerator of (12) is negative since (xL)2p0cxI > 0; cIp0xL > 0, and xLcxxcI < 0.
Moreover, the denominator is negative from (9). Thus, dXL=dI > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
As in the proof of Lemma 1, we show that dXL=dI = nL(dxL=dI)+(dnL=dI)xL > 0. By dif-
ferentiating (1) and (5), with c(x; I) and F being replaced with c(x) and F (I), respectively,
we obtain 0B@xLp0 + (xL)2p00 (nL + 1)p0 + nLxLp00   cxx
(xL)2p0 nLxLp0 + p  cx
1CA
0B@dnL
dxL
1CA =
0B@ 0
F 0
1CA dI: (13)
By applying Cramer's rule to (13), we obtain
dxL
dI
=
F 0xL(p0 + xLp00)
 (xL)2p0(2p0 + xLp00   c0xx)
(14)
and
dnL
dI
=
F 0( (nL + 1)p0   nLxLp00 + cxx)
 (xL)2p0(2p0 + xLp00   c0xx)
: (15)
Therefore,
dXL
dI
= nL
dxL
dI
+
dnL
dI
xL
=
F 0( xLp0 + xLcxx)
 (xL)2p0(2p0 + xLp00   c0xx)
> 0:
Q.E.D.
Before showing Proposition 2, we present a supplemental result that is useful for the
proof of this proposition.
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Lemma 3 cI xLcxI < (>;=) 0 if G is strictly concave (strictly convex, linear) with respect
to x.
Proof
cI(x
L:I)  xLcxI(xL; I) = 1
nL
Z xL
0
(Gx(n
L; xL; I) Gx(nL; x; I))dx (16)
where we use G(0; I) =  nLcI(0; I) = 0. Therefore, (17) is negative (positive, zero) if
Gxx < (>;=) 0. Q.E.D.
We now prove Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2 (i)
From (1), we obtain p > cx. Therefore, from (6), we nd that the marginal welfare gain
of public investment exceeds the marginal investment cost when I = IEL if and only if
@xL=@I > 0: Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 (ii){(iv)
From Proposition 2(i), we focus on the sign of @xL=@I. Since the denominator of (10) is
negative from (9), the sign of dxL=dI is determined by those of cI   xLcxI and p00.
From Lemma 3, dxL=dI = 0 if G is linear in x and demand function p is linear (i.e.
p00 = 0). This implies Proposition 2 (ii). Similarly, dxL=dI < (>)0 if G is concave (convex)
in x, the demand function p is concave (convex), and at least one of them is strictly concave
(convex). Thus, Proposition 2 (iii) and (iv) are obtained. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
From (7), we nd that the marginal welfare gain of public investment exceeds the marginal
investment cost when I = IEL if and only if @xL=@I > 0: We show that dxL=dI < 0 if the
strategies in the last stage are strategic substitutes (i.e. p0 + xLp00 < 0).
17
Equation (14) shows that the sign of dxL=dI < 0 depends on that of p0 + xLp00. Because
the denominator and F 0 are negative, dxL=dI < 0 if and only if p0 + xLp00 < 0. Q.E.D.
18
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